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Abstract  
This paper charts emerging scholarship on what I conceptualise as ‘compensatory cultures’; cultures that 
are, in essence, compensatory responses to crisis, but are presented and received as desirable, even 
preferable ways of organising life. Since the 2008 crash, precarity has become a new normal and a 
dominant structure-of-feeling in the global north. I argue that compensatory cultures alleviate precarity’s 
affective impacts, enabling ‘business as usual’, yet do so in ways that perpetuate that precarity and the 
conditions that reproduce it. I survey literature on compensatory urbanisms, compensatory labour and 
compensatory consumption; demonstrating the compensatory as a pervasive mechanism operating across 
various cultural settings in the post-recession, austerity context. The work explored reveals compensatory 
cultures as central in remaking places, structuring social relations and producing meaning in crisis times.  
 
Introduction  
There is broad consensus that we are living in precarious times. The effects of the 2008 financial crash 
are still felt globally and have been entrenched and exacerbated by austerity measures. Inequality is 
rising, labour insecurity is worsening and welfare is continually retracted. The housing crisis is also 
intensifying, especially in major cities of the Global North like San Francisco or London. Economic 
insecurity has been coupled with political turbulence, including the capricious presidency of Donald Trump 
in America and the chaos ensuing from the UK’s vote to leave the European Union. The spectre of the, 
now inevitable, effects of climate change adds to this picture of volatility and decline. In this context, 
scholars have explored precarity as a new normal and a dominant structure-of-feeling in the Global 
North1. Precarity has long been an acknowledged feature of labour economies2 but is now identified as 
a definitive characteristic of almost all aspects of life under austerity and recession.   
Elsewhere, myself and colleagues have argued that precarity is culturally, as well as socially and 
economically, entrenched3. An important aspect of precarity’s reproduction, and this paper’s focus, is the 
emergence of what I term ‘compensatory cultures’; cultures that mediate and make sense of precarity 
yet do so in ways that normalize and exacerbate it. Scholars are now exploring these cultures; examining 
how people make sense of their diminishing opportunities after 2008 through ways of living and working 
that compensate for those no longer feasible. Importantly, this work recognises how compensatory ways 
of living and working are not always straightforwardly experienced as deteriorations but can be 
invested with enthusiasm and optimism. Of course in crisis times people have always engaged 
compensatory mechanisms. Homeless families use ad-hoc decorative strategies to make compensatory 
                                                          
1Ben Anderson, Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions, Durham, Ashgate, 2014  
2 Hannah Lewis, Peter Dwyer, Stuart Hodkinson, ‘Hyper-precarious lives: Migrants, work and forced labour in the 
Global North, Progress in Human Geography, 39, 5 (2014), 580-600 
3 Ella Harris and Mel Nowicki, ‘Cultural Geographies of Precarity’, Cultural Geographies, 25, 3 (2018), 387-391 
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homes in hotel rooms4, volunteers run libraries closed by funding cuts5 and food banks serve as potentially 
‘placatory’ devices, a sticking plaster over the withdrawal of welfare support6. However, distinctive to 
the work explored here is its focus on cultures that are not (or at least not only) presented as 
compensatory but become desirable, even preferable, ways of organising life. I bring together this 
emerging work to demonstrate a growing scholarly interest in cultures that compensate for, glamorize 
and ultimately perpetuate precarious conditions under recession and austerity.  
Defining Compensatory Cultures  
My use of the term ‘compensatory’ is inspired by Fran Tonkiss’s description of how makeshift creative 
places in the ‘post-crisis city’7 offer ‘a kind of compensatory or diversionary urbanism in the face of 
political retreat and economic recession’8. Tonkiss uses the term ‘compensatory’ in passing to describe 
temporary urbanisms as a better-than-nothing scenario at times of crisis. Here, I develop and extend the 
term to show how, beyond temporary urbanisms, many post-crisis cultures can be understood as 
‘compensatory’ and to draw out their functions and impacts. Important in Tonkiss’ description is the 
alignment of compensatory with diversionary. Rather than being recognised as deteriorations, these are 
cultures that offer a diversion that to some extent muffles precarity’s effects. True to both meanings of 
the word diversion, these cultures must therefore be, at least to some degree, appealing and enjoyable.  
Culture has been conceived as ‘the very medium through which social change is experienced, contested 
and constituted’ and the means by which meaning is produced, negotiated and resisted by dominant and 
subcultural groups9. Speaking to this, I consider compensatory cultures as arenas where meanings are 
being produced and negotiated in the post-crisis landscape, specifically exploring how they restore 
dominant neoliberal values after the crash. Culture can be an expression of ‘power and consent’; can be 
‘enrolled into the establishment of a particular kind of common sense’10. If crises like that of 2008 are 
‘moments of potential change’ in which society can ‘move on to another version of the same thing’ or ‘to 
a somewhat transformed version’11 then I consider compensatory cultures as modes of restoring and 
perpetuating neoliberal values while transforming the cultures that embody them. Equally, compensatory 
cultures resonate with recognitions of culture as the means by which social relations and identities are 
                                                          
4 Mel Nowicki, Katherine Brickell, Ella Harris, ‘The Hotelisation of the housing crisis: Experiences of family 
homelessness in Dublin hotels’ The Geographical Journal, 185, 3 (2019) 
5 Kirsten Forket, Austerity as Public Mood: Social Anxieties and Social Struggles, London, Rowman & Littlefield 
International Ltd. 2017 
6 Paul Cloke, Jon May, Andrew Williams ‘The Geographies of food banks in the meantime’ Progress in Human 
Geography, 41, 6 (2017) 703-726 
7 Fran Tonkiss ‘Austerity Urbanism and the makeshift city’ City: analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, 
action, 17, 3 (2013) 312-324, p1.  
8 Tonkiss, 2013, p6.  
9 Denis Cosgrove and Peter Jackson, ‘New Directions in Cultural Geography’, Area, 19, 2 (1987), 95-10, p65.  
10 Cosgrove and Jackson, 1987, p65.  
11 Stuart Hall and Doreen Massey, ‘Interpreting the Crisis’, Soundings, 44 (2010), 57-71, p.57.  
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structured and understood1213. As the paper will consider, compensatory cultures can reproduce social 
inequalities at a time when precarity is increasingly felt across social groups, and be an arena in which 
social identities impacted by crisis and austerity are remade.  
Tracing the compensatory as a mechanism operating across diverse cultural settings, the paper explores 
three clusters of examples. I start with compensatory urbanisms, including pop-up culture and 
compensatory forms of housing like property guardianship and micro-living. Secondly, I explore 
compensatory labour cultures, including blue-collar work within hipster culture and the rise of 
‘mumpreneurs’ as well as the emergence of fitness cultures and branding motifs that compensate for 
stunted vocational opportunities. Thirdly, I examine compensatory consumption. I consider the consumption 
cultures of millennials and examine how ‘austerity chic’ and makes thrift appealing while encouraging 
continued consumption. Considering these arenas together demonstrates the compensatory as a now 
pervasive mechanism that operates in diverse cultural settings to remake places and modes of inhabiting 
them at a time of turbulence.  
The concept of compensatory cultures enables an articulation of what is common across the examples 
explored in this paper. I argue that the compensatory cultures considered all generate modes of 
encountering precarity that make it palatable. This is not necessarily a totalizing (re)imagination. As I 
and colleagues have explored elsewhere, experiences of precarity can persist despite and in the midst 
of the projection of positive imaginaries14. However, I show how compensatory cultures can allow subjects 
to continue with precarious ways of life and even make them appealing. As well as surveying existing 
examples of cultures that can be deemed compensatory, I also call for more nuanced investigations of 
the relational politics of such cultures. While most emerging scholarship on compensatory cultures focuses 
on how the middle-classes make sense of declining quality of life, it is important to consider how 
compensatory cultures function for other demographics and mediate encounters between different 
groups.  
Scholarship on compensatory cultures is prefigured by a long lineage of thought on the role of culture in 
disseminating and maintaining dominant political ideologies in the face of unpalatable working and 
living conditions. This includes Marx’s well known proclamation of religion as an ‘opium of the people’15; 
a diversion from conditions that would otherwise be untenable. Mid twentieth century cultural theorists 
have also explored how culture propagates and naturalises dominant ideologies while perpetuating 
dehumanising labour economies. This anticipates the mechanisms of contemporary compensatory cultures 
in many ways. For example, as we will see, some compensatory cultures do, as Marx argues of religion, 
                                                          
12 Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, Resistance through Rituals: Youth subcultures in post-war Britain. 
Birmingham, Routledge. 1991  
13 Tony Bennett, Mike Savage, Elizabeth Bortolaia Silva, Alan Warde, Modesto Gayo-Cal, David Wright, Culture, 
Class, Distinction, Oxford, Routledge, 2009.  
14 Ella Harris, Mel Nowicki and Katherine Brickell, ‘On-edge in the impasse: Inhabiting the housing crisis as 
structure-of-feeling’, Geoforum, 101 (2018)  
15 Karl Marx, ‘Introduction to Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, Online, Marxists.org, 1970  
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primarily function by distracting people from harsh conditions with a kind of ‘illusionary happiness’16. 
Like Barthes’ cultural ‘myths’ in the 1950s, compensatory cultures also naturalize concepts that are 
historically constructed and instrumental in a particular socio-economic climate17.  
However, elements of contemporary compensatory cultures are also distinctive to the contemporary 
context. Compensatory cultures function, predominantly, not through distraction from dire conditions, as 
Marx argues of religion, but by rebranding those conditions themselves. Adorno and Horkheimer note 
that culture still promotes and advertises ‘unattainable’ goods, even in war time, ‘merely to keep 
industrial power in view’18. Conversely, compensatory cultures promote the ways of living that do seem 
attainable in crisis times. For example, while Barthes describes how ‘fancy decorations’ within ornamental 
cooking distract from the unaffordability of expensive meals compensatory food cultures, as we’ll see, 
glamorize cheaper cooking methods rather than distracting from them19. While distraction, and 
displacements of enthusiasm, are an element of compensatory cultures the dominant compensatory 
mechanism is resignification; an overlaying of positive imaginaries onto reduced circumstances.  
Relatedly, compensatory cultures operate by perpetuating faith in the vanishing comforts of everyday 
life, rather than by encouraging investment in fantasies. If cultures previously promised an ‘illusory’ 
spectacle of a better life20 then, in compensatory cultures, the promised world is no longer Hollywood 
style fantasies but the old every-day. Post-crash cultures reassure us that nothing has fundamentally 
changed, despite stark evidence to the contrary. Connectedly, if 20th century cultures kept people 
working in systems that repressed them but generally speaking functioned on their own terms and for 
particular elite groups, compensatory cultures belong to an era of ‘zombie capitalism’. They keep people 
attached to what are arguably dead-systems-walking by naturalizing the failure of those systems; for 
example by maintaining the primacy of aspirational consumerism while reimagining ideal consumption 
as involving thrift and frugality.   
To understand the stakes of compensatory cultures it is useful to place the concept in proximity to Lauren 
Berlant’s ‘cruel optimism’. Cruel Optimism is an orientation to the world that exists when ‘the object that 
draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially’21. While not all instances 
of cruel optimism involve compensatory mechanisms, most compensatory mechanisms contain an 
orientation of cruel optimism. This is because the investment of optimism in them can preclude or dampen 
motivations to change the negative conditions they compensate for.  
                                                          
16 Karl Marx, 1970  
17 Roland Barthes, Mythologies. London, Jonathan Cape, 1972.  
18 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, New York, Herder and Herder, 1944. 
p162.  
19 Barthes, 1972, p79.  
20 Adorno and Horkheimer, p139.  
21 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism, Durham, Duke University Press, 2011, p1.  
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Compensatory cultures also need to be considered in relation to recent work on public moods22. They 
shed light on the complexity of how different moods interact, showing how anxiety, precarity or 
uncertainty arising from crisis conditions can be disguised or alleviated by hope and enthusiasm, moods 
that co-exist with and can be attached to those same conditions. If precarity is now a dominant structure-
of-feeling then compensatory cultures demonstrate how that public mood can be transmuted by affects 
and imaginaries that distract from precarity and/or rebrand precarious conditions as positive.  
Understanding the prevalence and impacts of these compensatory cultures, by tracing the multiple arenas 
they operate across, is crucial to understanding the contemporary condition. It sheds light on how and 
why life continues, seemingly blindly, in the face of crisis. Many have noted with bemusement the desire, 
in the post-2008 context, to carry on with business as usual23. It seems we would rather “Keep Calm and 
Carry On” or, more vacuously, “Keep Calm and Eat a Cupcake”24 than acknowledge the radical failure 
of the neoliberal capitalist system. The compliance of publics is often explained by reference to how 
anger and fear can find a home in government led narratives that blame crisis and austerity on welfare 
claimants and immigrants, thus distracting from systemic failures. However, it is clear that precarity is 
accepted and perpetuated not just by instrumentalizing negative emotions but also through investments 
of hope in practices or imaginaries that compensate for, and thereby mute the affective dimensions of, 
crisis conditions. Understanding compensatory cultures is therefore essential to understanding the 
conditions that perpetuate precarity. In particular, the paper teases out four key functions of 
compensatory cultures in relation to precarity’s reproduction, examining how precarity is entrenched by 
compensatory cultures, how compensatory cultures mediate changing identities and positionalities under 
crisis, how compensatory cultures prop up and resuscitate neoliberal capitalism and the orientation of 
cruel optimism within compensatory cultures.  
Compensatory Urbanisms  
Much scholarship on cities since the 2008 crash has focused on compensatory place-making. As Peck 
explores, cities are changing as ‘austerity urbanisms’ (Peck, 2012) defined by lack, closure and 
uncertainty emerge. Similarly, Hitchen and Shaw have examined the ‘shrinking world’ generated by 
austerity; a shrinkage manifest both in deteriorations of mental health, as horizons and aspirations 
contract, and in the ‘disappearing of social infrastructure’, including ‘public libraries, swimming pools, 
community centres, public parks, street lights, road maintenance, and adult social care’ (Hitchen & Shaw, 
2019). Alongside this, other work focuses on ‘compensatory urbanisms’ (Tonkiss, 2013) that have 
emerged amidst this landscape, responding to the post recessionary landscape of fractures and gaps to 
offer ad-hoc alternatives.   
                                                          
22see Forket, 2017, Anderson 2014 and Sarah Ahmed, ‘Not in the Mood’ New Formations: A Journal of Culture, 
Theory, Politics, 82 (2014), 13-28 
23 Will Davies ‘Exit From Nightmare: Will Davies on Economic Science Fictions’ London, Novara Media (2018)  
24 Tom Whyman ‘Beware of Cupcake Fascism’ The Guardian (2014)  
6 
 
One kind of place-making developed in the aftermath of the crash is pop-up culture. Pop-up has received 
attention for both responding to and entrenching urban precarity (Colomb, 2012; Harris, 2015). Pop-up 
is a trend for temporary and mobile place-making that emerged from the prevalence of vacant sites in 
large cities during the recession. Sites were left vacant as businesses shut down and developments ground 
to a halt. In London 10% of commercial property was allegedly vacant in 2009 (Savills World Research, 
2014). At the same time, funding cuts left charities and creative groups without capital. Pop-up became 
a solution to these combined circumstances. It was promoted as a way to fill up sites while also providing 
free or cheap space to creative groups, charities and small businesses. In 2009, the introduction of the 
‘Meanwhile Use Lease Contract’ gave owners of vacant properties in the UK exemption from business 
rates if they loaned their premises temporarily to non-profit groups.   
Pop-up is an archetypal ‘compensatory urbanism’ (Tonkiss, 2013). It developed because usual, preferred 
organisations of space had failed and yet quickly became actively desirable, both for consumers and 
stakeholders. Its origins in recession are now often forgotten as pop-up is positioned as a fashionable 
kind of place-making that can transform urban sites and add dynamism to high streets. Big brands like 
Nike and Selfridges now routinely run pop-up stores and pop-up shipping container malls, filled with a 
mix of established brands and small businesses, abound in London and other creative cities like Berlin, 
New York and Melbourne. Container malls were initially designed to be cheap and fast to construct on 
land that needed immediate regeneration and/or was only temporarily available (Martin, 2016), as, 
for example, with the container mall “Re-Start” erected in Christchurch after the commercial centre was 
destroyed by an earthquake in 2011. Now, though, container malls have acquired a ‘cult status’ (Slawik, 
et al., 2010). Boyel has examined the transformation of container aesthetics, arguing that, once 
associated with ‘prisons for the poor’ - used as detention centres, jails, and vessels for refugees - 
containers have been re-signified as settings for aspirational work and leisure, as in container malls and 
container hotels, cafes and restaurants (Boyel, 2016).  
Pop-up reimagines the spatial and temporal markers of precarity as positive; overlaying imaginaries of 
flexibility, surprise, immersion and interstitiality onto a landscape of uncertainty, insecurity, disorientation 
and fractures (AUTHOR, 2015, FORTHCOMING). This re-imagination of the ‘shrinking’ spaces of austerity 
(Hitchen & Shaw, 2019) normalizes the precarity of contemporary cities by enabling it to be encountered 
as intentional and congenial. Pop-up’s vision of uncertainty as creative and dynamic also inspires an 
investment of enthusiasm, on behalf of those who ‘pop-up’, in situations that only entrench their own 
precarity. As Graziano and Ferreri outline, pop-up tenants invest enthusiasm in pop-up places, which 
they see as exciting venues to work in, despite simultaneously being aware that their efforts primarily 
benefit landlords by increasing footfall and re-attracting long-term commercial investment (2014), 
ironically undermining their own claims to space. Tardiveau and Mallo likewise identify temporary use 
as a ‘locus of displacement’ where the energies of current users and the agendas of owners and future 
users are in conflict (Tardiveau & Mallo, 2014). However, rather than this leading creative groups to 
avoid temporary spaces, pop-up has become aspirational within the creative and cultural industries. As 
both Graziano and Ferreri (2014) and Mould (2014) have argued pop-up has been embraced by 
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creative communities as temporariness has become almost synonymous with creativity. In this way, pop-
up normalizes the idea that some claims to space should be provisional and temporary and, furthermore, 
mobilizes the efforts of those groups towards regenerations that entail their own displacement (AUTHOR, 
2015).  
Compensatory urbanisms also include compensatory housing. Amid a worsening housing crisis, emerging 
work on compensatory housing charts how, rather than finding solutions to the housing crisis, insecure 
housing is being reimagined. Alongside forms of housing that are clearly inadequate responses to crisis, 
such as the ‘beds in sheds’ phenomenon (the conversion of garden sheds into precarious rental 
accommodation) or Hong Kong’s sinister ‘coffin cubicles’ (15 sq ft. boxes rented in subdivided flats), there 
are compensatory housing cultures that similarly involve reductions in size, quality and security of tenure 
but are overlaid with positive imaginaries, making them actively appeal to potential occupants.  
Property Guardianship is one form of home-making that employs resignification as a compensatory 
mechanism. Property Guardianship, as most thoroughly explored by Ferreri, Dawson and Vasudevan 
(Ferreri, et al., 2017; Ferreri & Dawson, 2017), is both a form of housing tenure and a low-cost security 
service. Businesses have introduced;  
‘schemes that provide low-cost security of vacant buildings and protect them from squatting and 
vandalism. At the same time, the schemes enable individuals to find temporary accommodation in 
properties otherwise considered unsuitable for rent.’ (Ferreri, et al., 2017).  
As Ferreri et al. describe, property guardianship has been promoted as an ‘adventurous’ and ‘flexible’ 
lifestyle. It appeals to young people by mobilizing the aesthetic cultures of squatting, even while its role 
is explicitly to prevent squatters entering properties. They examine the precarity of property 
guardianship, which often involves living in badly maintained places lacking basic amenities such as 
heating or water, and provides tenants with short-term contracts that can give merely days to vacate. 
Property Guardianship has become a comparatively viable ways for young people to live in central 
urban locations, given the prohibitive price of rent and implausibility of home ownership. It is clearly a 
compensatory solution to the housing crisis and yet has been reimagined as desirable to the extent that 
young people will ‘self-precaritize’ (Ferreri & Dawson, 2017), electing to live in this insecure form of 
housing. Ferrari and Dawson cite offers from property guardianship companies of a way to ‘live 
somewhere unusual and meet great people’ (Ad Hoc, 2015 in Ferreri & Dawson, 2017) as well as the 
imaginaries that property guardians themselves bolster of property guardianships as ‘stimulating’, 
‘quirky’ and ‘liberating’ (Ferreri & Dawson, 2017, p. 432). Property Guardianship thereby rebrands 
insecure living arrangements, paradoxically presenting precarious housing as a solution to housing 
precarity. This irony is neatly encapsulated by a development called ‘SHED’ by one Property 
Guardianship company; a wooden shed that can be placed into particularly decrepit buildings to make 
liveable bedrooms for tenants. SHED has been credited as a way to ‘address the affordable housing 
crisis’ (Ro, 2017). Its promotion as a housing crisis solution is astonishing given the moral panic around the 
‘beds in sheds’ phenomenon as a pinnacle of housing precarity in the UK. Here, as characteristic of post-
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crash compensatory cultures, the problem and solution become one and the same; beds in sheds are 
identified as part of a crisis in housing, and yet the SHED, which literally provides a bed in a shed, is 
pitched as the solution.  
While property guardianship glamorizes erratic temporalities of housing access, other forms of 
compensatory housing glamorize the shrinkage of living space under the housing crisis (AUTHOR AND 
CO-WRITER, FORTHCOMING). In 2015, the New Ideas for Housing competition run by New London 
Architecture collated proposals for ‘intimate infrastructures’ (NLA, 2015) as a response to the housing 
crisis, encouraging living-spaces to ‘GET SMALLER!’. Termed ‘micro-living’, there has been a wave of 
investment into living-spaces that don’t conform to minimum space standards including self-contained 
properties and co-living-spaces (BPF, 2019), aimed at single adults. Earlier this year (Jan 2019) the 
Adam Smith Institute called for minimum space standards in London to be scrapped to enable micro-
living to become a significant part of London’s housing economy. Companies like ‘Pocket Living’ or 
‘Bicbloc’ are already offering flats as small as 18sqm for those struggling to get on the housing ladder 
and there has been a surge in rented, dormitory style, co-living-spaces aimed at young professionals, 
like “Tribe Co-Living” or “The Collective”. Micro-living is also taking off in European cities; there is 
currently a waiting list to rent ‘cabins’, some just 3sqm, with access to communal spaces in developments 
by the company Haibu in Barcelona and Paris.  
Many micro-living developments also integrate co-working spaces. If ‘flexible, temporary and volatile 
jobs…encourage unstable living conditions’ then co-working and living-spaces are seen to counter this 
by finding security in collectivity. Co-living buildings have a range of shared socialising and working 
spaces (anticipating freelance work situations and desires of residents to ‘network’) as well as small 
private units; cultivating a space that ‘enables varying relations based in living and labour’ (Bhatia & 
Steinmuller, 2018, p. 124).  If traditionally, anti-capitalist versions of co-living have offered respite from 
capitalist labour cultures, then co-living, as a commodified, corporate co-option of this lineage, instead 
normalizes and enables the precarity of neoliberal work, including its conflation of labour and domestic 
space-times. The Collective, for example, provides work spaces that can be used ‘day or night’ by those 
with ‘unpredictable schedules’ as well as social sites where ‘profession development’ and networking 
opportunities can arise between residents (Collective, 2019). Here, what are clearly conditions of crisis, 
a housing market so unaffordable that minimum space-standards are being sacrificed and an epidemic 
of labour precarity so entrenched that housing has had to adapt to make labour viable, are reimagined 
as progressive forms of housing that speak to the desired lifestyles of young people. As the website for 
‘Town Flats’, a planned development by U&i PLC, claims, micro-living;  
“fits in with the way in which people's lives are evolving...[including] people's increasing desire 
to have fewer things and take up less space” U&I website  
Framing micro-living as an evolution, and omitting engagement with its negative implications – such as its 
impact on the ability of residents to have families - repositions this compensatory form of housing as 
innovative and prescient.  
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While micro-living has, as yet, received little scholarly attention it is a crucial topic of enquiry given its 
widespread promotion as a solution to housing crises. There is currently more published work on the 
similar “tiny homes” movement (Evans, 2018). Tiny homes, like micro-living, are small living-spaces. They 
‘occupy a gray area between trailer/mobile home/recreational vehicle and a house’ and are often on 
wheels to sidestep the regulations applied to permanent residences (Ford & Gomez-Lanier, 2017, p. 
400). Tiny homes are also narrativized as a response to desires for minimalism and decluttering (Ford & 
Gomez-Lanier, 2017) while acknowledged as a response to issues of affordability and pressure on 
space in urban centres. Tiny homes are positioned as solutions for those concerned with environmental 
sustainability and connected to a tradition of simple, rural living (Anson, 2014). Yet, ironically, tiny homes 
have ‘become a part of popular culture, feeding into the consumerism trends they were supposed to 
deviate from’ (Ford & Gomez-Lanier, 2017, p. 402). Ford and Gomez-Lanier highlight the rise of TV 
shows about tiny house building or buying, which position ‘the tiny house movement as the new trend in 
consumerism’ and a luxury product (Ford & Gomez-Lanier, 2017, p. 402). Again, a compensatory housing 
culture is reframed as a glamorous product and aspirational lifestyle.   
While property guardianship and micro-living glamorize compensatory housing for (mostly) middle-class 
millennials, myself and colleagues have explored how compensatory housing for more marginalized 
demographics can also be glamorized. Focusing on Lewisham Council’s development PLACE/Ladywell, a 
block of modular, mobile social housing, we have examined how pop-up has been deployed as a format 
for housing homeless families. We argued that, at a time when permanent social housing is being 
retracted, the pop-up label, which celebrates ephemerality, is used to promote temporary social housing 
in ways that distract from the systemic dismantling of housing welfare while normalizing the idea that 
social housing should be temporary (AUTHOR AND CO-WRITERS, 2018). However, our research found 
that pop-up social housing has placatory functions not for residents themselves (who remain highly anxious 
about their housing situation) but for stakeholders who can feel like they are addressing rising levels of 
homelessness yet do so in ways that don’t contest the neoliberal housing model.   
Across the examples of compensatory urbanisms outlined it is clear that compensatory cultures further 
entrench the precarity they arise from. Pop-up normalizes temporary and provisional apportioning of 
urban space to demographics whose activities are less financially profitable. Likewise, the ways property 
guardianship and micro-living repackage diminished quality, security and size of accommodation as 
desirable serves to shift expectations of the kinds of housing people should accept.   
Compensatory Labour  
Work on compensatory labour cultures considers how diminished vocational aspirations have been 
navigated through emerging work cultures that overlay positive imaginaries onto changes in work types 
and patterns. Relatedly, Hakim’s work on the fashionability of muscularity has demonstrated how other 
cultures, here gym culture, can distract from dwindling career prospects so that searches for value are 
displaced down alternative paths. In this section, I outline explorations of two reimagined work cultures; 
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the rebranding of blue-collar work within the craft economy and the glamorization of freelance labour 
done by stay-at-home mums, before exploring Hakim’s work on the diversionary function of gym cultures.  
There is increasing interest in how aesthetics and imaginaries within craft economies and hipster culture 
make blue-collar labour palatable for middle-class people disenfranchised by the recession. As Ocejo 
explores, young, educated middle-class people are increasingly taking what would previously have 
been ‘bad’ jobs (Ocejo, 2017). These are jobs like bar and café work and small scale manufacturing, 
that are unstable, precarious and require workers to ‘get their hands dirty, stand on their feet all day, 
do heavy lifting, sweat and deal with various splashes, spills and stains’ as well as to ‘engage in emotional 
labour’ (Ocejo, 2017, p. 17). Morgan and Nelligan have argued that the stretching of the term ‘creative’ 
as a branding that can be applied to almost any occupation, including ‘home decorating, hair dressing 
and gardening’ as well as cooking, persuades people denied fulfilment in other kinds of work to 
enthusiastically take on such roles (Morgan & Nelligan, 2018, p. 106).  
Luckman examines how a recalibration of taste on behalf of consumers accompanies and drives this 
uptake of ‘bad’ jobs by the middle-classes. She writes that ‘the mechanical tools of the industrial age 
are ready to be re-signified as bespoke when used on a small-scale, artisanal level producing quality 
items for a growing ‘discerning’ middle-class audience’ (Luckman, 2015, pp. xiii-xiv). The resignification 
of the products of blue-collar labour as craft products also repositions that labour itself so that despite 
such jobs being low paid and physically and emotionally strenuous they are deemed valuable. As Ojeco 
frames it, jobs like barbering, cocktail making and light manufacturing, when figured through imaginaries 
of craft and artisanality are seen as ‘among the new elite’ (Ocejo, 2017, p. 5). Crucially, this allows 
workers to pursue such careers ‘without experiencing them as downward social mobility’ (Ocejo, 2017, 
p. 5). Rather than recognising these roles as compensatory forms of labour at a time of reduced 
vocational opportunities, they experience them as jobs that give pleasure.  
In pre-crash cities, the promotion of ‘creativity’ – driven by the creative city discourses of Landry and 
Florida (Florida, 2004; Landry, 2008) – led workers to embrace menial and administrative roles within 
creative industries on the conviction that ‘being there’ – in the milieu of creative production – would 
enable a breakthrough (Morgan & Nelligan, 2018, p. 105). However, while in these circumstances 
workers stomach unfulfilling roles because of the promise of future career opportunities (Morgan & 
Nelligan, 2018, p. 5), the compensatory culture of craft economy work does not hold a particular promise 
for the future but instead reimagines the current reality of precarious and menial ‘bad jobs’ as desirable.  
For Morgan and Nelligan, creative work appeals to those ‘long denied any semblance of vocational 
fulfilment’ because such roles seem to offer relief from the meaninglessness of Taylorism or to enable 
participation in artistic, subcultural or resistive practices excluded within other labour models (Morgan & 
Nelligan, 2018, p. 105). Dissatisfaction with ‘bullshit’ jobs – jobs which even those who do them can see 
little value or purpose in (Graeber, 2013) - is heightened in the ongoing aftermath of the 2008 crash. 
This is in part because of a loss of conviction in the integrity of the capitalist system. It is also because of 
a loss of faith, on a personal level, in ‘conventional lines of social mobility’, a realisation that career paths 
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positioned as offering financial and/or cultural progress no longer guarantee that at all (Morgan & 
Nelligan, 2018, p. 109). In this context, the myth of creativity is infused into varying vocations, allowing 
them to offer an ostensible antidote to the vapidity and self-interest of neoliberal labour cultures.  
As well as a revaluing of the products of blue-collar labour, Ocejo and Luckman both explore how the 
work process itself is infused with meaning, in imagined opposition to bullshit jobs and the greed of big 
business. They show that imaginaries of environmentalism are attached to craft production, which, 
operating on a small scale, can be seen as less wasteful than mass production. Creative work is also 
imagined as more inclusive of diversity, despite the reality of huge inequalities within the creative 
industries, where women, LGBT, and non-white people are vastly under represented (Gill, 2014). Equally, 
meaningfulness is, Ocejo argues, attached to the shared nature of the spaces where this kind of work 
takes place; communities of small businesses occupying markets, shipping container malls or co-working 
buildings who gather around a desire for a community in opposition to the soulless, impersonal version 
of capitalism symbolised by office work.  For Morgan and Nelligan, this kind of work at least allows 
people to feel that they haven’t bought into the ‘spiel’ of employers or ‘conscripted’ their souls ‘to 
rationalize a long period of tertiary study and incurring debt’ (Morgan & Nelligan, 2018, p. 109).  
The meanings of creativity in compensatory labour cultures depart somewhat from the ‘creative cities’ 
discourses prevalent at the turn of the 21st Century, before the crash. For Richard Florida, the ‘creative 
class’ was defined loosely as anyone engaged in ‘creative problem-solving’, valorising many forms of 
corporate work, including ‘financial services…and business management’ as well as artistic vocations 
deemed to drive economic growth (Florida, 2004, p. 8). In the post-crash climate, creativity is instead 
increasingly connected to imaginaries of simpler times before the advent of corporate economies, 
including to histories of small scale manufacturing. 
The craft economy work performed in Chelsea Market in New York, as portrayed by Ocejo, associates 
itself with historical forms of urban production and commerce where people are invited to ‘experience 
the industrial past through a lens of modern urban consumerism’ (Ocejo, 2017, p. 2). The shop designs 
are reminiscent of a time when small scale industry took place in Global North cities like New York or 
London, before the global shift undid this industrial economy and brought with it the complexities of 
contemporary capitalism. Luckman also argues that the desire for jobs that involve making, cooking, 
knitting, growing, repairing and small scale craft betray a longing for retreat into the domestic and the 
DIY which she, quoting Crawford (2009), suggests is about the need for the world to feel intelligible, for 
people ‘to recover a field of vision that is basically human in scale, and extricate themselves from 
dependence on the obscure forces of a global economy (Crawford, 2009, 8, in Luckman 2015, 41). For 
Luckman, the growing prominence of the hipster aesthetic and craft sensibility can be explained as, in 
part, a reaction to the financial crash; ‘successfully making something offers the sense of unequivocal 
achievement missing in the lives of many white-collar professionals’ and, at the same time, speaks to the 
burden newly ‘placed on the individual to create their own employment options as part of the wider 
project of fashioning the conditions of their own life’ (44). We can therefore see hipster aesthetics and 
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the ethos of the craft economy as a way of narrativizing experiences of crisis and making compensatory 
forms of labour appealing. This is not to say that meaning and value cannot be contained within these 
work cultures, but that it is important to locate this shift as a compensatory practice – and to explore the 
meanings attached to the craft economy as, in part, ways of making sense of diminishing options and 
loss of faith in the promises of corporate culture.  
Another labour culture identified as compensatory is ‘mumpreneurship’. The figure of the mumpreneur is 
a specific characterisation of women with children who do freelance work from home. These women are 
celebrated as entrepreneurial business-women who tend to work in areas related to domesticity or 
childcare; making luxury domestic goods, food, toiletries or providing products and services for babies 
and children (Garrett, n.d.). As scholars including Jo Littler, Shani Orgad and Roberta Garret have 
argued, mumpreneurship has intensified since the recession firstly as mumpreneurs are ‘often public sector 
workers that have either been pushed or opted to take redundancy in the wake of coalition cuts to public 
services’ and secondly in that ‘many of the services they provide, particularly in the area of franchised 
playgroups...or basic advice on children’s health and safety are moving into the space vacated by 
dwindling public services” (Garrett, n.d.). Within these circumstances, mumpreneurship allegedly allows 
women to provide their own childcare while pursuing desirable careers. Mumpreneurship is also part of 
a wider shift towards self-employment driven by recession, including ‘forced’ and ‘sham’ self-
employment, by which people are pushed into self-employed status because of unemployment and 
subcontracting (Littler, 2018, p. 185).  
In this context, the characterisation of mumprenuerial work as aspirational, including self-characterisation 
via social media, can be seen as a glamorization of compensatory forms of work and service provision 
that have disproportionally impacted on women. The figure of the mumpreneur reclassifies adjustments 
to diminishing economic circumstances as business-minded innovation. The ‘step back into the home [for 
women] in times of austerity’ (Hall, 2015, p. 146), is presented as desirable, while clearly evidence of 
the retrogressive impacts of austerity on gender equality. For Orgad, mumpreneurship is comparable to 
strategies that 1960s housewives found to cope with the oppression and dissatisfaction of being confined 
to the home, strategies like dying one’s hair blonde’ or ‘having another baby’; diversions in an otherwise 
unliveable situation (Friedan in Orgad, 2019, p. 142). Investment in the ideals of mumpreneurship by 
women themselves lead them, she argues, to accept their marginalization in the post-crash economy 
(153). Mumpreneurship compensates for the relegation of women back to the home, naturalizing ‘the 
home as the locus of unequal labor’ by rebranding it as an ‘almost magical space; an ideal location for 
middle-class, creative labor’ (158). It also compensates for the fact that in the wake of the recession it is 
women, not men, who have been forced (back) into caregiving roles. Promoting mumpreneurship avoids 
the question of why ‘caregiving continues to be...the primary responsibility of women’ by assuring them 
that they can still pursue careers (159). Here, again, we see the ironic branding of a problem as its own 
solution; mumpreneurship compensates for women being relegated to the home and childcare roles by 
promoting women spending more time in the home and on childcare related pursuits.  
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Furthermore, rather than invest hope in a future return to the work place, mumpreneurs are encouraged 
to be enthusiastic about staying at home, while self-precartizing in order to continue to contribute 
economically. If cultures have formerly provided unfulfilled workers with the promise of a better future, 
be that by working towards greater security or by winning the lotteries of fame and fortune (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1944) compensatory cultures don’t make such promises about the future, instead 
encouraging self-governing investment in the precarity of the present.  This reflects the wider imperative 
in contemporary precarious labour cultures for the subject to be self-governing, creating a “DIY 
biography” in conditions of radical uncertainty, which include the impossibility of imagining one’s own 
future” (Gill, 2014, p. 516).  
Those who cannot or choose not to invest optimism in present precarities are often shamed.  The 
characterisation of mumpreneurs differentiates between a ‘thrifty, no-nonsense’ middle-class woman 
willing to ‘do her bit’ to get through austerity and the other ‘figure of abject femininity which has also 
loomed large in the rhetoric of austerity: the scrounging ‘Chav’ mum’. In contrast to the allegedly greedy 
Chav mum, mumpreneurs are ‘responsible, self-sufficient individuals whose response to economic or 
personal catastrophe (eg. redundancy, caring for a disabled child) is to find ingenious ways to provide 
for their families rather than relying on state handouts’ (Garrett, n.d.). The mumpreneur is, then, also a 
normative ideal that shames women who are not financially self-reliant while mediating the changing 
vocational opportunities and gender roles of middle-class women.  
Banet-Weiser has similarly explored how rising un and underemployment has been recast as an 
opportunity for individuals. She explores how, in America, post-recessional advertising cultures have 
turned crisis itself into a brand, reframing it as ‘a destined quality of Americanness’ within which 
individuals have new scope for self-discovery and innovation. Banet-Weiser makes these arguments in 
relation to two advertising campaigns, the ‘Go Forth’ campaign by Levis and an advert by the car 
company Chrysler. In relation to the Levis campaign she explores how visual tropes of post-industrial 
wastelands alongside images evocative of virgin natural territories position crisis as an opportunity for 
people, especially men, to create their own prosperity, to ‘Go Forth’ within a landscape of crisis induced 
destitution that is reframed as a new American frontier. In her discussion of the Chyrsler advert she 
examines its paradoxical use of the crisis conditions faced by Detroit (caused by the failures of the car 
manufacturing industry) to market Chyrsler cars. The advert features Eminem and his hit track ‘Lose 
Yourself’, a motivational song that captures the precarity of life in poverty while insisting on the ability 
of the individual to take their ‘one shot’ opportunity to create a prosperous future. Banet-Weiser explores 
how a ‘selective history’ (Banet-Weiser, 2012) is deployed to make invisible the role of Chrysler in 
Detroit’s crisis, as well as its own financial bailout, while not only putting the onus on individuals to make 
their own economic opportunities in the face of widespread unemployment, but glamorizing the prospect 
by framing it as a heroic come-back.  
Banet-Weiser’s analysis of the branding of the crisis in advertising cultures illuminates a trope that 
functions across compensatory cultures, of what she terms an ‘a-historical abstraction’. She highlights the 
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assertion in the Levis advert that ‘things got broken here’ as an abstraction that discourages the 
apportioning of blame and in doing so allows capitalism to use its own failure as a marketing mechanism. 
Reminiscent of Mark Fisher’s claims that it is now impossible to imagine a world beyond capitalism (Fisher, 
2009) Banet-Weiser’s discussion highlights how crisis itself is re-signified as an entrepreneurial 
opportunity. In the UK context, Jensen has similarly traced a ‘magical transformation of austerity [ensuing 
from recession], from an ideological assault on the welfare state into a positive opportunity for good 
citizens to embrace a leaner and more sustainable form of living” (Jensen, 2018, p. 125) as well as the 
alleged opportunities of self-employment, such as mumpreneurship.   
As stated in the introduction, while most compensatory cultures primarily operate by re-imagining 
placatory solutions or adverse conditions as actively desirable, distraction from negative circumstances 
through investment in alternatives is also a feature. This includes Hakim’s work on ‘Fit’ as the ‘New Rich.’ 
Hakim examines how middle-class white men have turned to the pursuit of fitness and muscularity at a 
time when vocational opportunities are dwindling. A fixation on fitness, and on self-representation via 
‘healthies’ (fitness related selfies) on social media, has arisen since 2008 and offers an ‘insight into some 
of the complex and contradictory feelings that arise among young people living in the austerity moment’ 
as well as into why neoliberalism has remained hegemonic despite the crash (Hakim, 2016, p. 89). Hakim 
writes that  
“Historically, white, male, middle-class, straight men have been able to use their minds and not 
their bodies in order to become valuable in Western Culture” (Hakim, 2016).  
Yet, since the crash, ‘traditional breadwinning capacities are being eroded’ (Hakim, 2016, p. 84) 
meaning markers of value employed by straight white middle-class men, like buying a house or a car or 
being able to financially support a family, have become unattainable for many. For Hakim, this is the 
reason white middle-class men are investing copious time and energy into gym programs and diets 
designed to maximize muscularity, a value creation practice more routinely associated with black men 
(McKenzie, 2015). Hakim argues that while muscularity is promoted as aspirational, it serves as a 
compensatory culture, making up for the unattainability of jobs and financial security. He suggests that 
this phenomenon can be read as ‘cruel optimism’ (Berlant, 2011) in that it offers an object for men to 
attach hope to, yet is one that does nothing to fix the problems which drive them to it initially.   
As Hakim discusses, fitness cultures make up for dwindling vocational and financial prospects but also 
mediate the impact this has on masculinities. Men who previously relied on economic success for self-
worth, and held economic prowess as a tenant of masculinity, use fitness cultures to make up for the 
damage done to male self-image by recession (Negra, 2013). Similarly, accounts of mumpreneurs make 
clear how such characterisations mediate the retraction of equal opportunities for women under austerity. 
We have also seen how compensatory cultures can mediate changing class positionalities, as in how the 
craft economy helps middle-class workers to negotiate changing job prospects. This early scholarship 
sketches an important terrain, mapping out how, and in what kinds of places, the impacts of recession 
and austerity on identity and positionality are negotiated. As this work develops, however, more focus 
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is needed on the relationality of these cultures, to the encounters and conflicts that are staged as class 
positions and gender roles are remade in the aftermath of the crash.  
Compensatory Consumption  
Compensatory mechanisms have also been identified in recent consumption cultures. This work largely 
focuses on ‘austerity chic’ as an aesthetic mobilized within fashion, homeware and culinary cultures, but 
has also included commentary on the consumption practices of millennials. Millennials have been berated 
in the media for their consumption habits. In 2017 Tim Gurner, an Australian businessman, suggested that 
Millennials are failing to get on the property ladder because of their taste for extravagances like 
‘smashed avocado.’ A ‘global debate’ ensued as to whether the financial problems of millennials are 
indeed caused by recklessly buying avocados, flat whites and granola or by the housing crisis, recession 
and austerity measures (Sternberg, 2019). Many argued that the Millennials’ conspicuous consumption 
trends ‘compensate for their feeling of powerlessness’, allowing them to at least enjoy some of the 
privileges promised to them in the relatively favourable economic climate of their youth and making up 
for experiences of precarity in work and housing cultures (Bellet, 2015, p. 1). While, as recession era 
consumers, Millennials are encouraged to be frugal, exceptions are made for ‘items that serve a 
consolatory or fanciful function in uncertain times’; a ‘splurge piece’ that promises ‘escape from harsh 
realities’ and is, ironically, a way to ‘compensate for having a depressed bank account’ (Nathanson, 
2014, p. 141).  
Equally, however, Millennials’ consumption trends express a kind of nihilistic short-term-ism. Given 
promised securities are now largely unattainable, many young adults have stopped aspiring to 
traditional markers of adulthood. Green argues that people unable to get on the property ladder have 
been infantilized by the crisis. Because they are spending longer living at home with parents, or in 
inadequate housing settings, they are having to delay ‘entering long-term relationships and starting 
families’ (Green, 2017). In this context compensatory consumption patterns have arisen that make up for, 
but also reinforce, the stunted life worlds of millennials, including a rise in childless adults enjoying 
consumption cultures designed for children, such as the Disney industry. Childless adults are increasingly 
visiting Disney Land (Tait, 2019) and engaging in fashion and makeup cultures based around ‘the 
princesshood phenomenon’ (Negra, 2009). This kind of compensatory culture again brands the problem 
as the solution, making up for the infantalizing impacts of recession on millennials by offering them 
infantilized leisure cultures.  
While scholarship on millennial consumption cultures is in its early stages, there is a more established 
body of work on ‘austerity chic.’ Bramall defines three core meanings of austerity chic including; objects 
and clothes that hark back to historical austerity regimes in the 1940s and 50s, demonstrations of thrift 
including upcycling or making items from scratch and a performance of thrift as a means to future cultural 
capital, i.e. by ‘being seen to be roughing it’ ‘by “snubbing a Starbucks latte in favour of a bacon 
sandwich and a nice cup of tea’ at a taxi shelter’ (Bramall, 2013, pp. 22-23). While Bramall asserts that 
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austerity chic can inform progressive subject positions, she also emphasises its functions as a compensatory 
imaginary that glamorizes precarity.  
Following Bramall’s first definition, many have argued that allusions to historical austerity create 
complicity with austerity today while using imaginaries of thrift to – ironically - encourage continued 
consumption. As Hall and Holmes explore, the revival of slogans including ‘keep calm and carry on’ and 
‘make do and mend’ has been widespread and used to foster enthusiasm for ‘consumer cultures and 
patterns associated with the austerity of the 1930s to 1950s, including crafting, cooking, and cultivation’ 
(Hall & Holmes, 2017). ‘These activities’, they argue, represent a successful historic response to economic 
crisis and austerity during and following the first and second world wars’. As Bramall notes, TV celebrity 
Kirstie Allsopp has become ‘a champion of the philosophy of ‘make do and mend’, identifying it as a 
kind of ‘coping mechanism’ people should turn to’ (Bramall, 2013, p. 20). As suggested by the term 
‘coping mechanism’, mending and crafting cultures intensified at a time when disposable incomes were 
squeezed. These cultures are glamorized via a romanticized vision of historical war-time austerity; an 
imaginary of pulling through hard times with stoic resourcefulness. Likewise, Biressi and Nunn in their 
discussion of the opening ceremony to the 2012 Olympics games explore how the mega-event was 
mobilized to foster compliance with austerity, making use of the economic parallels between the last 
‘austerity games’ held in Britain in 1948 and the 2012 Olympics. They argue that the opening ceremony 
evoked war-time solidarity and ‘invited the airing of personal recollections of shoe-string sports and 
‘making do’ (114) in order to ‘frame current austerity measures as painful but necessary’ (Biressi & Nunn, 
2013, p. 114).  
Bramall also explores how historical austerity aesthetics are connected to environmental concerns. She 
highlights products like ration cards produced by the ‘Ministry of Trying to do something about it’, which 
used war-time aesthetics to promote ration books helping users to reduce their environmental footprint. 
Their promotional website states ‘It’s time to sit down, have a nice cup of tea, and ask yourself “What 
can we do right now, today, this instant?”, mobilizing traditional British culture (tea drinking), as well as 
the war-time practice of rationing, towards environmental agendas. However, while environmental 
consciousness is clearly important, such programs arguably use it to strengthen the case for austerity 
culture. Accepting environmental concerns as the main impetus behind products like the ‘Ration me up’ 
book ignores the economic context within which these war-time imaginaries are being excavated. 
Furthermore, the ethical inflection given to austerity through alignment with environmentalism serves to 
shame, as Jensen writes, ‘classed ‘others’, who, become constructed as insufficiently austere; who do not 
reuse, recycle, upcycle, who are wasteful’ (Jensen, 2018, p. 129).  
Yet while fostering complicity with austerity, austerity chic also encourages people to keep consuming. 
War-time austerity aesthetics have popularized products like kitsch enamel ware (Bramall, 2013), old 
fashioned clothing or dress making patterns (Hall & Jayne, 2016). Directives to consume are also, 
ironically, channelled through instructions on how to be thrifty. In discussing ‘austerity foodscapes’ Potter 
and Westall describe how home-growing, thrift and re-use are promoted within contemporary food 
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cultures but argue that this version of thrift actually encourages consumption, as it is often premised on 
re-using ingredients or leftovers from more lavish meals assumed to have been cooked previously (Potter 
& Westall, 2013).  
Potter and Westall also elucidate how the temporal imaginaries of food cultures bolster capitalism while 
purporting to offer respite from it. They argue that two different ‘compensatory motifs’ are discernible. 
Firstly a motif of ‘time-saving acceleration’ seen in the promotion of quick recipes, like Jamie’s 15 minute 
meals, designed to reduce the ‘temporal burden’ of cooking. Secondly, there is a motif of ‘calming 
deceleration’, the idea that time can be slowed down and savoured ‘via culinary pleasure and escape’ 
to find windows for domestic harmony and self-care (Potter & Westall, 2013, p. 169). However, both 
these compensatory mechanisms are contradictory. They are pitched as compensating for the ‘temporal 
deficit’ produced by life under neoliberal capitalism, the demands of which mean we are in ‘perpetual 
time arears’ (167) and yet these acts of ‘temporal compensation’ primarily serve rather than alleviate 
the effects of capitalism, encouraging ‘acts of purchasing that not only contribute to surplus-value in 
production, but ‘free up’ more surplus labour-time for its creation (Potter & Westall, 2013, p. 169). Here, 
we have a clear picture of what compensatory mechanisms share with ‘cruel optimism’ – the attachment 
of hope to practices that seek to escape situations they only perpetuate. Equally, and as seen in the 
section above, the obvious gendering of austerity chic – in its promotion of re-enactments of women’s 
war-time practices of mending and crafting - entails cruel optimism. Such gendered cultures offer a site 
of enthusiasm and means of getting by for women, who have been disproportionately impacted by 
austerity cuts (Karamessini & Rubery, 2014), while simultaneously glamorizing the retrogressive gender 
roles instigated by those cuts.  
As Bramall argues, austerity chic also entails a performance of ‘slumming it’ that encourages certain kinds 
of consumption, like shopping at cheaper supermarkets or encouraging compensatory purchases, like DIY 
hair dying kits rather than appointments in hair salons (Papworth, 2010). For Nathanson, recession era 
fashion blogs perpetuate the ‘fantasy of [clothes] shopping’ while reframing fashion consumption as a 
frugal activity. Blogs make fashion seem ‘less frivolous and more useful’ because they are written by 
‘real’ ‘every-day girls’ (Nathanson, 2014, p. 137) and framed around resourcefulness and ‘cost 
consciousness’ (148). Nathanson explores how the figure of the ‘recessionista’ was used ‘by the fashion 
industry to identify and target an audience it regarded as rightfully fearful about spending in such an 
economically unstable climate’ (139) and encourage their continued consumption by defining this figure 
as ‘a careful shopper who does not abandon consumer culture altogether in the light of the global 
recession’ (139). Importantly then, while compensatory consumption cultures promote frugality, they 
position the truly responsible recession-era citizen as one who finds cunning ways to keep spending by 
making personal sacrifices and alterations.  
A compensatory consumption culture related to austerity chic is consumption encouraged via a 
glamorization of marginalized cultures. Scholars, mostly American, have explored the appropriation of 
classed and racialized food cultures by the white middle-classes (LeBesco & Naccarato, 2015). They 
18 
 
explore how hipsters generate ‘culinary capital’ to demonstrate belonging in gentrifying urban areas 
like Brooklyn or Harlem, by cultivating taste and knowledge for cuisines popular with disenfranchised 
ethnic minority groups in those areas and/or traditionally inexpensive local products like the now famous 
‘chopped cheese’ sandwich (Sprague, 2018). The supposed ‘discovery’ of such food cultures by white 
middle-class people has been termed ‘Columbusing’ (Seid, 2018), a neologism highlighting the unequal 
power dynamics and cultural appropriation at work in the promotion of ‘authentic’ ethnic cuisines to the 
white middle-classes.  
Indeed, compensatory consumption, while serving to make sense of declining incomes and opportunities 
for the middle-classes, can widen and reinforce inequality, as well as shaming those experiencing more 
severe poverty. Potter and Westall argue of austerity food cultures that the requirement to purchase 
items that become ‘leftovers’, and the unrealistic demands on time for cooking, mean that this foodscape’s 
function is not to offer relief from food poverty but to shame those struggling by demonstrating a mode 
of resourcefulness they are failing to attain (Potter & Westall, 2013). Compensatory cultures are about 
keeping up appearances and although they can be acknowledged as second best solutions, evidence of 
real hardship, such as skip-diving for food (Jensen, 2018, p. 128), is not part of their imaginaries, which 
exclude those experiencing crisis most acutely. Hall and Holmes have likewise highlighted the insensitivity 
of celebrations of austere practices. They write that enjoyment of austerity ‘is at best insensitive, and at 
worst insulting, for the experiences of those at the sharpest end of the cuts to become bundled up with 
either a niggling sense of nostalgia, or to be lumped together with those who are ‘just’ feeling the pinch 
(Hall & Holmes, 2017). Indeed, austerity chic glosses over the most serious hardships experienced as a 
result of austerity cuts, replacing this reality with imaginaries of pleasurable but cost saving activities 
infused with ‘the kitsch notion of a ‘wartime effort’’. Crucially, as we have seen, compensatory 
consumption cultures also encourage spending, at the same time as asserting the importance of thrift and 
austerity, thereby supporting and maintaining neoliberal capitalism despite being direct evidence of its 
failures.  
Conclusions 
In this paper I have traced a growing interest in how cultures emerging since the 2008 recession are 
compensating for the resultant precarity, while entrenching and normalizing that precarity. Across the 
work surveyed it is clear that such cultures generate attachments, enthusiasms and diversions that enable 
life to continue in precarious times. If precarity is today’s dominant structure-of-feeling (Anderson, 2014) 
then compensatory cultures dampen and transmute its affects. They cultivate positive feelings that re-
signify the conditions of precarity to make them palatable or even desirable.  
Exploring emergent work on compensatory cultures has unearthed their key functions. Firstly, we have 
seen how compensatory cultures normalize and entrench precarity. Rather than promising a better future, 
the compensatory mechanism glamorizes the precarity of today, rebranding problems as solutions. 
Secondly, it is clear that compensatory cultures mediate changing identities and positionalities, serving, 
for example as a salve for damaged masculinities. Thirdly, compensatory cultures can be understood as 
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mechanisms through which neoliberal capitalism is sustained in the aftermath of the crash. Compensatory 
cultures distract from capitalism’s failure, encourage continued consumption despite shrinking disposable 
incomes and shift the onus onto individuals for creating economic opportunities. Lastly, an orientation of 
cruel optimism is evident in compensatory cultures, which sustain life in times of crisis yet also preclude 
actions that might meaningfully address the causes and results of that crisis, naturalizing the failures of 
neoliberal systems while paradoxically sustaining faith in them.  
As seen with pop-up culture, the compensatory origins of cultures can be rapidly forgotten as they 
become routine ways of reproducing contemporary life. Attention to the development, functions and 
implications of these cultures is therefore pertinent. It is crucial to trace their connections to and 
instrumentalities within crisis conditions before they are fully naturalized. Important avenues for future 
research include further engagement with the gender dynamics of compensatory cultures. Apparent 
across this paper is how compensatory cultures appeal to and transform gender identities. The impact of 
recession on gender roles has been highlighted in the edited collection Gendering the Recession (Negra 
& Tasker, 2014), which draws out the contrasting demands made on men and women by recession and 
austerity. In this vein, more work is necessary to elucidate the different ways that compensatory cultures 
enlist men and women, and how this reflects changing constructions of gender since 2008. While most 
work to date has focused on compensatory cultures in relation to cisgender men and women it is important 
that future work engages with all gender identities, so as not to reinforce exclusionary binaries and 
definitions at a time when gender minorities are especially stigmaized and persecuted. Scholars and 
practitioners working on transgender identities have explored practices that transgender men, women 
and non-binary people employ to perform gender identities at a time when austerity cuts have made it 
increasingly difficult to access the resources needed to transition and/or to maintain gender identities 
(Beninger, et al., 2013). However, there is little work on whether, and if so how, glamorized compensatory 
cultures mediate impacts of recession and austerity for non-cisgender people.  
Further attention is also needed to relationships between class and compensatory cultures. We have seen 
how compensatory cultures can reproduce social inequalities and compound the already unequal impacts 
of austerity and neoliberal capitalism. Most existing work focuses on how compensatory cultures help the 
middle-classes negotiate changing circumstances. It is important to consider how compensatory cultures 
operate beyond middle-class settings in the post-2008 context. Explorations of compensatory 
mechanisms in working-class settings have largley been in the context of counter cultures which, while 
diversionary responses to precarity, are also resistive of the dominant cultures through which precarity is 
produced as, for example, in the forms of identity and public space making achieved through music 
cultures like hip-hop (Shabazz, 2014) or punk rock (Debies-Carl, 2014). As we have seen, a key feature 
of compensatory cultures is that they create attachements of cruel optimism, perpetuating the precarity 
they arise from rather than primarily offering resistance to its productive forces. More investigation is 
therefore needed of how compensatory cultures in working-class settings can also generate complicity 
with dominant ideologies and agendas.  
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Equally, more attention is needed to how compensatory cultures mediate interactions between social 
classes at a time when economic opportunities and fortunes are changing across class spectrums and 
when people from different class backgrounds come into contact in new ways and spaces. For example, 
‘class tourism’ is an important compensatory culture within which class positionalities are being remade in 
post-crisis cities. Class tourism is a trend for marketing middle-class sites of consumption in formerly 
working-class spaces by highlighting the ‘unusual’ nature of those sites. This can be seen in examples such 
as the Job Centre pub in Deptford, London; a job centred ‘themed’ pub named after the service it 
replaced, shut by funding cuts. Class tourism is a compensatory consumption culture in that it is aimed at 
middle-class people who have themselves been displaced to more deprived neighbourhoods of cities. 
The ‘tourism’ part of class tourism implies a foray into ‘slumming it’ for people who can later return to 
comfort and security, but this interpretation is complicated by a climate in which the middle-classes have 
also experienced reductions in quality of life. In this context such consumption cultures emerge as 
compensatory, enabling the middle-classes to acclimatise to (as well as colonize) areas formerly 
undesirable to them. Arguably, class tourism reinforces class divisions by allowing the middle-classes to 
identify themselves as present in spaces of deprivation ironically and/or ludicly (Elliott, 2014). Likewise, 
as indicated by work on Columbusing within hipster food cultures, compensatory cultures intersect with 
changing racial dynamics of post-2008 societies, a topic which also demands further attention. There has 
been work on how recession-era TV cultures delink racial politics from systemic reasons for worsening 
racial inequality, including the ‘national and global economic crisis’ (Molina-Guzman, 2014, p. 61) and 
the European debt crisis (Imre, 2014, p. 247). While the functions of these TV cultures differ somewhat 
to compensatory cultures, they indicate a naturalization of intensified racial inequality in the post-crash 
era that should be explored in relation to compensatory mechanisms too. Further explorations are also 
required of the environmental narratives employed within many compensatory cultures and to how these 
narratives relate to growing recognition of the precarity caused by climate change.  
By developing compensatory cultures as a concept, drawing together existing scholarship on such cultures, 
and identifying key commonalities of their features and functions, this paper has laid ground work for 
important future scholarship. Exploring compensatory cultures is crucial to understanding how social and 
cultural life is evolving in the aftermath of the 2008 crash. If culture is where meanings and values are 
negotiated, resisted and reproduced, then compensatory cultures give a crucial insight into how and why 
neoliberal capitalist values are being sustained despite the shocks to the system produced by the crash. 
Further explored, they can also help us to understand how social relations and divisions (including across 
class, race and gender as briefly explored in this paper) are being remade in the post-crisis climate.  
 
 
 
 
